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As observed by Nielsen, the imposition of Church’s Principle limitates the set of observables of
a closed quantum system to be a subset of the whole class of self-adjoint operators. Such an issue is
here rigorously discusses by the algebraic approach to super-selection rules as a new Computability
Superselection Rule. The latter is showed to have a simple physical explication.
I. INTRODUCTION
The Classical Theory of Computability is based on Church’s Principle asserting that the class of functions "eectively
computable", with respect to the informal notion of eective computability, is the class of partial recursive functions
[1].
Even though it is a basic principle of the Mathematical Theory of Computation, Church Principle is indeed a
physical assertion stating which is the class of functions physics permits to be eectively-computed.
So far this principle has been strongly corroborated by all the studied phenomena involving classical deterministic
physics.
As far as quantum phenomena are concerned the situation is somewhat more fuzzy, and has been, for a decade,
of great popularity, partially due to the books of R. Penrose [2], [3] and the numerous discussions emerged from
the criticisms they gave rise to, mainly from mathematicians showing the inconsistency of Penrose’s way of using
Godel’s theorem [4], [5], [6], as well as from neuroscientists showing the fallacity of the Penrose-Hamero analysis of
microtubules [7].
In his books Penrose states two main theses: (1) the orthodox Copenhagen interpretation of Quantum Theory
is inconsistent in that it does not explain nor the double nature of the quantum dynamical evolution (i.e. the co-
the existence of both the reduction process (R-process) and the unitary process (U-process)) neither the
conceptual incompatibility of such processes; (2) Standard Quantum Mechanics is only a phenomenological theory
describing the low-energy phenomena of a dierent theory in which the general-relativity eects on quantum theory
result in a unique dynamical process ( the true process (T-process)) unifying the R-process and the U-process
in a way phenomenologically described by some kind of Ghirardi-Rimini-Weber mechanism [8], [9]. The T-process
is not-recursive, a feature that may be assuemd to stay at the basis of the not-algorithmic nature of human-brain,
through the intrinsically quantum behaviour of microtubules. A part some exceptions [10] the common opinion
among researchers in the eld of Quantum Computation is dierent [11]: indeed the latter generally adopt as their
paradigm Deutch’s Quantum Turing Machine, which can compute those and only those functions that are computable
by classical Turing machines, i.e. the recursive ones [12].
Curiously a more possibilistic point of view is proposed by those one would expect to defend Church’s Principle with
more strength: mathematical-logicians and recursion-theoreticists who better recognize the possible implications that
the substitution of Classical Logic with Quantum Logic could eventually lead to ( see the discussion of the P-Thesis
of Kreisel in [1] ). A very interesting observation about such issue has been recently made by M. Nielsen [13] who
observed that Quantum Mechanics is compatible with Church’s Principle only at the prize of restricting the class of
admissible operators and states by a kind of suitable Superselection-rule [14].
Nielsen’s argument has been contrasted by M. Ozawa [15] who asserts, on the basis of an argument of mathematical-
logic that we shall analyze in the sequel, the inconsistency of Nielsen’s remark.
In this letter we try to settle the issue resorting to the Algebraic Approach to Quantum Mechanics [16], [17], and
formulating it as a well-posed problem of Recursive Algebra [18].
The organization of the paper is the following.
In sect. 2 we investigate the plausibility of dening the recursive elements of a Von Neumann algebra as those
having recursive spectrum (as Nielsen’s considerations would suggest). This is done by analyzing, in the particular
case of the W*-algebra of the bounded linear operators B(H) on a separable Hilbert space H, the relation existing
between such a denition and the Pour-El Richards notion of an eectively-determined linear operator [19].
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In sect. 3 Nielsen’s argument is reformulated in the language of the algebraic approach to Quantum Mechanics, in
terms of a Computability Superselection-rule.
In sect. 4 the inconsistency of Ozawa’s criticism to Nielsen’s argument is explicitly shown.
In sect. 5 we show that, in spite of its conceptual purport, the existence of the Computability Superselection Rule
has a simple physical explanation.
A notational remark: a total (i.e. ordinary ) function f from a set A to a set B will be indicated as f : A ! B;
a partial function f from A to B, i.e a total function f from a subset D(f)  A ( said the domain of f ) to B will
be indicated as f : A 7! B. If x 2 D(f) we shall say that f halts on x and denote this as f(x) # . If instead
x 2 (A−D(f)) we shall say that f doesn’t halt on x and will denote it as f(x) " .
II. RECURSIVE PART OF A VON NEUMANN ALGEBRA
The class FP00 of partial recursive functions is dened as the smallest class of natural partial functions over an
n-uple of natural numbers containing the zero-function, the succesor-function, the projection on single coordinates
and closed under composition, primitive recursion and minimalization.
In the class of partial recursive functions the total functions constitute the sub-class FP00 of recursive functions.
A set of natural numbers is called recursive enumerable (recursive) i its characteristic function is partial recursive
(recursive).
These basic notions of Classical Recursion Theory may be used to introduce the relevant concepts of Computable
Analysis.
Given a sequence of rational numbers frk 2 Qgk∈N we call it recursive i:




Such a sequence is said to converge recursively to a real number x (r − limk→∞ rk = x) i:




The set of recursive real numbers is then dened as:
00(R)  fx 2 R : 9frk 2 Qgk∈Ncomputable : r − lim
k→∞
rk = xg (2.3)
while a complex number is dened to be recursive i its real and imaginary parts are recursive:
00(C)  fz 2 C : <(z),=(z) 2 00(R)g (2.4)
The intuitive idea behind this way of characterizing recursive real or complex numbers corresponds to their possibility
of being eectively approximated to any desired degree of precision by a computer program given in advance.
Nielsen’s argument, that will be better analyzed in the following section, suggests to dene the eective part of a
Von Neumann algebra A as:
00(A)  fa 2 A : Spectrum(a)  00(C)g (2.5)
Marian B Pour-El and Jonathan Ian Richards [19] have recentely extablished many interesting results about the
eective-content of the spectral theory of operators on Banach spaces.
It is therefore interesting to see if our trial denition reduces to the Pour-El Richards one for the particular case of
the W*-algebra B(H) of bounded linear operators on a separable Hilbert space H.
The starting point of the Pour El Richards construction is the notion of a computability structure on a Banach
space.
Given a Banach space B on the real/complex eld they dene a computability structure on B as a a specication
of a subset S of the set of all the sequences in B identied as the set of the computable sequences on B satysfying the
following axioms:
- AXIOM 1 ( linear forms ) :
given two computable sequences fxng and fxng in B, two recursive double sequence of real/complex numbers





αn,kxk + βn,kyk (2.6)
is computable;
- AXIOM 2 ( limits )
any sequence fxng obtained as the recursive limit for k !1 of a computable double sequence xn,k is computable;
- AXIOM 3 ( norms )
taking the norms of all elements of a computable sequence fxng in B results in a recursive sequence of real numbers.
These axioms contains some notion that need to be claried.
First of all let us observe that, given a sequence fxng of real or complex numbers, the fact that each element of
the sequence is recursive, and can, consequentely, be eectively approximated to any desired degree of precision by
a computer program Pn given in advance doesn’t imply the recursivity of the whole sequence since there might not
exist a way of combining the sequence of programs fPng in an unique program P computing the whole sequence fxng.
Given a double sequence fxn,k 2 Rg and an other sequence fxng of real numbers :
lim
k→∞
xn,k = xn8n 2 N (2.7)
fxn,kg is said to converge recursively to fxng(r − limk→∞ xn,k = xn) i:
9e : N N ! N 2 F00 : (k > e(n, N) )j rk − x j
1
2N
)8n 2 N, 8N 2 N (2.8)
A recursive sequence of real numbers is then simply dened as a sequence fxn 2 Rgn∈N such that:
9frn,k 2 Qgn,k∈N :j rn,k − xn j 12k (2.9)
while the recursivity of a sequence of complex numbers is characterized by the recursivity of both the sequences of
their real and imaginary parts.
The above argument should clarify why the denition of a computability structure on a Banach space B is made
through a proper specications of the computable sequence in B and not, simply, by the specication of a proper set
of the computables vectors.
The notion of a computable vector, instead, is immediately induced by the assignment on B of a computability
structure S : the set of computable vectors on B is dened as:
00(B)  fx 2 B : fx, x, x, . . .g 2 Sg (2.10)
The Axioms 1,2,3 have a transparent intuitive meaning: since a Banach space is made up of a vector space V, a norm
on V and a condition of closure for limits, it is natural to acquire analogous eective requirements into the set of
computable sequences .
Unfortunately such axioms do not provide the axiomatic denition of a unique structure for a Banach space B since
B admits, generally, many computability-structures.
This requires the existence of an additional condition whereby the univocity condition can be obtained.
Given a computability structure S on a Banach space B, a computable sequence feng on a Banach space B, a
computable sequence whose linear span is dense in B is called an eective generating set for B; a Banach space is
then called eectively-separable if it has eectively generating sets.
Pour-El and Ian-Richards proved the following:
theorem 1 (of stability) Let B be a Banach space ; if two effectively separable computability structures S1 and S2
on B both contain an effective generating set feng 2 S1 \ S2 , then they are equal.
In particular, as far as Quantum Mechanics is concerned, given a physical system with Hilbert space of states H, the
existence of a measurable operator having as eigenvectors a basis feng of H gives us immediately an univocal notion
of computability on H: that associated to the eective generating set feng (said an eective-basis of H).
Given such an eectively separable Hilbert space H one can successively deal with the notion of computability of
linear operators.
Pour-El and Richards dene effectively-determined a closed linear operator T on H such that there exist a com-
putable sequence feng in H with the property:
f(en, T, en)gis a computable sequence of HH (2.11)
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and:
linear − spanf(en, T, en)g is dense in the graph Γ(T ) of T (2.12)
The intuitive idea behind such a denition is the following:
for a bounded operator to be considered computable, it is required that its action on any computable vector is
eectively determinable; for an unbounded operator, anyway, this is not sucient because, not being dened on all
H but only on a dense subspace of it, we must be able to solve recursively the corresponding "halting problem", i.e.
we must have an eective-algorithm that , given a generic computable vector x of H tells us whether T halts (Tx #)
or not (Tx ").
We shall indicate the set of all the eectively-determined linear operators on H by OP00(H).
We can, nally, face our motivating question: wich relation exists between OP00(H) and 00(B(H)) ?
A rst obvious observation is that:
OP00(H) 6= 00(B(H)) (2.13)
because OP00(H)) contains also unbounded operators. To answer our question we have to introduce two further
basic results of Pour-El and Richards:
theorem 2 Let X,Y be Banach spaces endowed with computability structures, feng an effective generating set of X
and T : X 7! Y a closed linear operator such that:
feng  D(T ) (2.14)
and:
the sequence fTeng is computable in Y (2.15)
Then:
T (00(X))  00(X) , T is bounded (2.16)
theorem 3 Let H be an effectively-separable Hilbert space, feng an effective generating set of H and T 2 OP00(H)
a self-adjoint effectively determined linear operator on H.
Then there exist fλn 2 Rgn∈N such that:
λn 2 Spectrum(T ) 8n 2 N (2.17)
Spectrum(T ) = closure[fλng] (2.18)
eigenvalues(T ) = fλn : n 2 N−Ag (2.19)
eigenvalues(T )  00(R) (2.20)
Let us consider now a quantum physical system having eectively separable Hilbert space of states H and an eective-
basis feng .
Theorem 2 implies that each operator of 00(B(H)) preserves the computability.
Theorem 3 states that the spectrum of an eectively-determined self-adjoint operator on H is the closure of a
recursive sequence of real numbers.
We can therefore immediately infer that bounded self-adjoint computable operators with only pure-point singular
spectrum surely belong to the recursive part of the W*-algebra B(H); furthermore, since recursive real sets are
preserved by the operation of taking the closure [20] such a result may be extended to operators with arbitrary
spectrum.
Pour-El and Richards insist on the fact "eigenvectors are more unlikely computable than eigenvalues"; for example,
given an eectively-determined operator, the recursiveness of an eigenvalue doesn’t imply the computability of the
corresponding eigenvectors.
It is possible that recursiveness of the spectrum of an operator absolutely does not imply its computability in that:
B(H) \OP00(H) 6= 00(B(H)) (2.21)
The latter observation has relevant implications for the discussion of Nielsen’s argument.
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III. NIELSEN’S ARGUMENT IN W*-ALGEBRAIC LANGUAGE
As recalled in the Introduction, many among of the discussions about the algorithmic/not-algorithmic nature of
quantum physical laws involve the so-called Interpretational Problem of Quantum Mechanics.
We adopt here the Copenhagen intrepretation without entering its so called consistency-probelms, adopting
Thirring’s algebraic axiomatization of quantum mechanics (cfr. point 2.2.32 in par. 2.2 of [16]).
Nielsen has argued that Church’s Principle is compatible with Quantum Mechanics only at the prize of assuming
the existence of a Computability Superselection Rule. We formalize his remark considerating a closed quantum system
with some given C*-algebra A as algebra of observables.
Given a physical system S with observable-algebra A,ee dene the Church-compatible part of A as:
AChurch  fa 2 A : a physical observable of a physical system S ; violation of Church′s Principleg (3.1)
and the Church-compatible part of S(A) , the set of all the states on A, as:
SChurch(A)  fω 2 S(A) : ω is a physical state of S ; violation of Church′s Principle g (3.2)
Given a self-adjoint element a 2 A of the algebra of observables we shall call as experimental device for a (Dev(a))
a physical black-box that, receiving as input a state ω 2 S(A) furnishes as output, according to the probability-
distribution Pωλ on Sp(a), a couple (λ 2 Sp(A), ω 2 S(A)) such that: ωλ(A) = 0.
Nielsen considers a self-adjoint not-recursive element of the W*-algebra A, a 2 (A − 00(A)) having pure-point
spectrum :
Spectrum(a) = ff(n)gn∈N , f : N ! N /2 F00 (3.3)
Then he introduces the following procedure that we call Nielsen’s algorithm for a (and denote by NIELSEN[a]):
1. START
2. preparation of the system S in the state ωn inducing on the spectrum of the "number observable":
an : Spectruman = N [a, an] = 0 (3.4)
the probability distribution Pωn = δn,k
3. construction of a Dev(a)
4. utilization of Dev(a) with input ωn
5. lecture of the output given by Dev(a)
6. HALT
Then Nielsen claims the following:
theorem 4 (Nielsen’s inference) if NIELSEN[a] is an effectively realizable procedure (w.r.t. the informal notion
of effective realizability) then a /2 AChurch
PROOF: The eective procedure NIELSEN[a] is an eective-computation of the not-recursive function f and this
violates Church’s Principle Q.E.D.
According to [13] this implies that we have to choose between the following two irreconcilable alternatives:
1. we accept that Quantum Mechanics violates Church’s Principle;
2. insisting in assuming the validity of Church’s Principle we deduce the existence of a new Superselection Rule,
the Computability Superselection Rule, stating that self-adjoint elements of A − AChurch are not admissible
physical observables (with an induced restriction of the admissible states to SChurch(A)).
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As far as the mathematical characterization of AChurch and SChurch(A) is concerned we may attempt to generalize
the scheme relaxing the hypothesis that our not-recursive elements of the C*-algebra A has pure-point spectrum.
Nielsen’s argument would suggest us the following conjecture: AChurch = fa 2 00(A) : a is self − adjoint g, but
one immediately realizes that the issue is more complicated.
Considered, in fact, the case in which A = B(H), with H an eectively-separable Hilbert space of states endowed




f(n)jenihenj : (f : N ! N /2 F00) ^ (feng not− effective basis of H) (3.5)
The fact that the basis feng that diagonalizes f^ is not-eective could seem to assure that no measurement of such an
operator can lead to a violation of Church’s principle even if, clearly, f^ /2 00(A).
This in turn would suggest that the forbidden operators are not simply those having a non-recursive spectrum, but
those having a non-recursive spectrum w.r.t. an eective basis, which leads us back to the analysis of the mathematical
relation betweeen OP00(H) and 00(B(H)).
IV. CONFUTATION OF OZAWA’S ARGUMENT ON THE AUTOMATIC SATISFACTION OF
CHURCH’S PRINCIPLE
A sharp criticism to Nielsen’s arguments has been moved by M. Ozawa [15] through an argument that, if valid,
would denitely settle the question about the recursive/not-recursive nature of Quantum Mechanics.
In this paragraph, anyway, we aim to show the inconsistence of Ozawa’s argument whose two main ingredients are
the following well-known results of Mathematical Logic [1].
theorem 5 (on the representability in ZFC) assuming the consistence of the formal system of Zermelo-Fraenkel
with the Axiom of Choice (ZFC) it follows that any function representable in ZFC is recursive
theorem 6 (on the undecidability of ZFC from inside) the statement ” ZFC is consistent” is undecidable in
ZFC
Ozawa observes that any book, article, review on the recursive/not-recursive nature of Quantum Mechanics is written
in mathematical language and, then, its statements are formulas of the formal system giving foundation to Mathe-
matics, namely ZFC.
This would be true, obviously, also for any statement of the form:
s(QP, f)  ”the quantum process QP computates the function f” (4.1)
Ozawa’s argument, then, runs as follow:
1. if s(QP,f) may be shown to be a physical truth, this implies that, properly eectively-codied as a numerical
function, s(QP,f) must be representable in ZFC
2. inside ZFC, we cannot prove its consistence; however for our mathematical and physical work to be meaningful
we must assume the consistence of ZFC
3. but then, for the theorem 5, it follows that f is a recursive function
In other words, for Ozawa, the very fact that mathematically one expresses the computability of a function by some
physical device implies its recursivity.
Both the argument and the general conclusion, however, do not appear to be correct: point 3 does not hold, in that
it cannot be inferred from point 2, after which we may only infer that s(QP,f) must be a recursive function.
Of course recursivity of s(QP,f) does not imply the recursivity of f and the whole argument fails.
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V. THE PHYSICAL EXPLICATION OF COMPUTABILITY SUPERSELECTION RULE
Nielsen’s argument could be interpreted as the statement of a new superselection-rule, i.e. a new physical law.
In physical terms, however, Computability Superselection Rule is simply a tautology stating that, if we believe,
adopting Church’s Principle, that the only eectively computable functions are the recursive functions, then we must
conclude that we cannot consider as a physical observable an operator whose eective measuration would require,
precisely, the eective-computation of a not-recursive function.
Let us, in fact, considerate once more Nielsen’s procedure for a self-adjoint element a of the W*-algebra A.
The step 3 has necessary the form:
1. eective computation of the function f
2. some other eective - operation
So we see that step 3 is eectively-realizable, assuming Church’s Principle, precisely i the function f is recursive.
One could at this point object that it might not be necessary to build the device Dev(a): we could be so lucky to
already nd, in our world, some object Obj that is precisely a device for measuring a.
The answer to such an objection is that it is certainly possible, (and perhaps also probable) that in Nature there
exist some object that is a device for measuring a 2 A. But, to use such an object in Nielsen’s procedure, we should
substitute step 3 with:
step 3’ : recognize that the object Obj is a device for measuring a, i.e. that Obj = Dev(a).
But again this step has necessarily the form:
1. eective computation of the function f
2. some other eective - operation
Once more Computability Superselection-rule ends up in a tautology.
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